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Abstract
The democratization of AI tools for content gen-
eration, combined with unrestricted access to mass
media for all (e.g. through microblogging and so-
cial media), makes it increasingly hard for people
to distinguish fact from fiction. This raises the
question of how individual opinions evolve in such
a networked environment without grounding in a
known reality. The dominant approach to study-
ing this problem uses simple models from the social
sciences on how individuals change their opinions
when exposed to their social neighborhood, and ap-
plies them on large social networks.
We propose a novel model that incorporates two
known social phenomena: (i) Biased Assimilation:
the tendency of individuals to adopt other opin-
ions if they are similar to their own; (ii) Back-
fire Effect: the fact that an opposite opinion may
further entrench someone in their stance, making
their opinion more extreme instead of moderating
it. To the best of our knowledge this is the first
model that captures the Backfire Effect. A thorough
theoretical and empirical analysis of the proposed
model reveals intuitive conditions for polarization
and consensus to exist, as well as the properties of
the resulting opinions.
1 Introduction
Recent years have seen an increasing amount of attention
from the computational social sciences in the study of opinion
formation and polarization over social networks, with appli-
cations ranging from politics to brand perception [Conover
et al., 2011; Gionis et al., 2013; Akoglu, 2014]. Much
of this research leverages pre-existing opinion formation
models that have been studied for decades [Jackson, 2008;
Castellano et al., 2009]. These models formalize the fact that
people form their opinions through interactions with others.
One of the best-known models is DeGroot’s model [DeGroot,
1974], which considers an individual’s opinion as dynamic,
assuming that it is updated as the weighted average of the in-
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dividual’s current opinion and those of her social neighbors.
The weights represent the strength of the social connections.
DeGroot’s model is elegant and intuitive and it guarantees
that the opinions converge towards a consensus [DeGroot,
1974; Jackson, 2008]. Yet, the opinions cannot polarize,
contradicting empirical observations [Baron et al., 1996;
Gilbert et al., 2009]. Variants of DeGroot’s model have been
proposed that incorporate biased assimilation [Krause, 2000;
Dandekar et al., 2013], which is also known as confir-
mation bias or myside bias and refers to the phenomenon
where information that corroborates someone’s beliefs affects
those beliefs more strongly than information that contradicts
it [Lord et al., 1979]. Incorporating biased assimilation has
been shown to potentially lead to polarization [Dandekar et
al., 2013] or opinion clustering [Krause, 2000].
An extreme manifestation of confirmation bias is a behav-
ior known in social psychology as the Backfire Effect [Ny-
han and Reifler, 2010; Allahverdyan and Galstyan, 2014]. It
refers to the fact that, when an individual is faced with infor-
mation that contradicts their opinion, they will not only tend
to discredit it, but they will also become more entrenched and
thus extreme in their opinion. The backfire effect may help
explain the emergence of polarization. Yet, it has so far been
overlooked by existing opinion formation models.
Motivated by these observations, we propose the BEBA
model, a novel opinion formation model that simultaneously
models the Backfire Effect and Biased Assimilation. BEBA
depends on a single—intuitive, node-dependent—parameter
βi, which we call the entrenchment of node i. It captures
both the tendency of node i to become more entrenched by
opposing opinions and the bias towards assimilating opinions
favorable to its own. Our main contributions are:
• We propose the BEBA model of opinion formation, which
accounts for both the Backfire Effect and Biased Assimi-
lation (Section 3). To the best of our knowledge BEBA is
the first model that incorporates the Backfire Effect.
• We theoretically analyze the BEBA model in Section 4,
studying conditions for reaching consensus or polarization.
• In Section 5 we empirically evaluate, on real and synthetic
data, the effect of both network topology and initial opin-
ions on polarization / convergence.
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2 Related Work
Opinion formation has been studied in diverse research
fields, from psychology and social sciences to economics and
physics [Jackson, 2008; Castellano et al., 2009]. The former
mostly use empirical methods to understand the factors that
affect opinion formation, while the latter mostly aim to un-
derstand emergent behavior implied by these theories.
Two observations from psychology and social sciences re-
lating to our work are the biased assimilation and backfire ef-
fect [Corner et al., 2012; Lord and Taylor, 2009], which state
that individuals are more inclined to accept opinions closer
to their own [Lord et al., 1979], and that, when exposed to
the opposite opinion, individuals entrench themselves in their
own opinion [Nyhan and Reifler, 2010; Chong and Druck-
man, 2007; Herr, 1986], respectively.
We study the common setting where opinions are for-
malized as real values, formed through social interactions
(see [Jackson, 2008] and [Castellano et al., 2009] for
surveys). The most popular models include the Voter
model [Clifford and Sudbury, 1973; Holley and Liggett,
1975], DeGroot’s model [DeGroot, 1974], and the Friedkin-
Johnsen model [Friedkin and Johnsen, 1990]. Yet, none of
these account for the biased assimilation or backfire effect.
There is work on modeling the fact that users are more in-
fluenced by opinions closer to their own. The bounded con-
fidence models [Deffuant et al., 2000; Deffuant et al., 2002;
Hegselmann and Krause, 2002] assume that a user is influ-
enced only by opinions that are within  of its own. The work
of Kempe et al., [Kempe et al., 2016] assumes that there are
different types of opinions and users are influenced by opin-
ions of similar types. Das et al., [Das et al., 2014] consider
a biased version of the voter model that biases individuals to
adopt similar opinions. The work most closely related to ours
is that of Dandekar et al., [Dandekar et al., 2013] who pro-
pose a variant of DeGroot’s model to capture the biased as-
similation effect. In their model, the importance that a node
attaches to the opinion of a neighbor depends on their agree-
ment. However, it does not model the backfire effect.
3 Model definition
In this section, we first describe existing models on which
our work builds and then introduce our nonlinear opinion for-
mation BEBA model, which is generalized from DeGroot’s
model, and accounts for both backfire effect and biased as-
similation. Finally, we provide a comparison between our
BEBA and the related biased opinion formation model on a
simple example, to highlight their qualitative differences.
3.1 Preliminaries and background
Notation. Let G = (V,E) denote a connected undirected
network, with V = {1, ..., n} the set of nodes, and E ∈ V ×
V the set of m = |E| edges, where (i, j) ∈ E iff (j, i) ∈
E. When the network is weighted, wij = wji represents
the weight of edge (i, j). We use N(i) to denote the set of
neighbors of node i: N(i) , {j ∈ V |(i, j) ∈ E}.
In the considered models, opinions are real numbers within
a fixed interval [0, 1] or [−1, 1], depending on the model. To
discriminate between the two, we use x to denote the opin-
ions within [0, 1], and y to denote the opinions that belong to
[−1, 1]. All models we consider in this work can be defined
as dynamical systems, where opinions are updated iteratively.
We use xi(t) (resp. yi(t)) to denote the opinion of node i at
iteration (time) t = 0, 1, 2, . . .. We further use x(t) and y(t)
to denote the opinion vectors for the network at time t. With
xi (resp. yi) we denote the opinion of node i after conver-
gences for t → ∞ (if that limit exists), and x (resp. y) to
denote the corresponding vectors.
DeGroot’s Model. This model [DeGroot, 1974] is an averag-
ing opinion formation model, where the individual’s opinion
is determined by the average of her own opinion and that of
her neighbors. More specifically, it is updated as follows:
xi(t+ 1) =
wiixi(t) +
∑
j∈N(i) wijxj(t)
wii +
∑
j∈N(i) wij
(1)
where wii represents the extent to which the node values
its own opinion, and wij is the strength of the connec-
tion/friendship between node i and j. Iterative opinion up-
dates will converge to a stationary state, where every node
has the same opinion xi = x∗ [Jackson, 2008]. Therefore,
the model always reaches consensus, and never polarizes.
Biased Opinion Formation. The BOF model [Dandekar et
al., 2013] generalizes DeGroot’s to incorporate biased assim-
ilation. Given a weighted undirected graph G = (V,E,w),
every node i ∈ V is assigned a bias parameter bi ≥ 0. Higher
values of bi means that node i is more biased. The opinion
value xi(t) ∈ [0, 1] is interpreted as the degree of support for
opinion position 1 (i.e., the highest possible opinion value),
while 1− xi(t) is the support for 0. It is defined as
xi(t+ 1) =
wiixi(t) + (xi(t))
bisi(t)
wii + (xi(t))bisi(t) + (1− xi(t))bi(di − si(t))
where si(t) ,
∑
j∈N(i) wijxj(t) is the weighted sum of
i’s neighbouring opinions, and di ,
∑
j∈N(i) wij is the
weighted degree of node i. During the updating process,
node i weighs confirming and disconfirming evidence in a
biased way: weighing the neighboring support for opinion 1
by (xi(t))bi , and that for opinion 0 by (1− xi(t))bi .
3.2 The BEBA model
We now define the BEBA model, which is a generalization
of DeGroot’s model that incorporates both biased assimila-
tion and backfire effect. To capture these phenomena, we
adapt DeGroot’s model by dynamically setting the weights
on the edges. Let y(t) denote the vector of opinions at time
t, with yi(t) ∈ [−1, 1]. Then, rather than using fixed weights
as in DeGroot’s model, we propose to let the weights be de-
termined by the opinions as well. Specifically, for an edge
(i, j) ∈ E we define the edge weight wij(t) at time t as
wij(t) = βiyi(t)yj(t) + 1.
The product yi(t)yj(t) captures the degree of (dis)agreement
between the opinions of node pair (i, j). The parameter βi >
0 models the influence for i that the (dis)agreement with node
j will have on the weight wij(t): the larger, the stronger the
biased assimilation and backfire effects. We will refer to βi
as the entrenchment parameter of node i.
Given the weight wij(t), the opinions in the BEBA model
are updated as in DeGroot’s model:
yi(t+ 1) =
wiiyi(t) +
∑
j∈N(i) wij(t)yj(t)
wii +
∑
j∈N(i) wij(t)
(2)
Note that when βi = 0, BEBA’s update rule is identical to
that of DeGroot’s (Eq. (1)) for unweighted networks. When
βi 6= 0, we discriminate two cases depending on wij(t):
1. wij(t) < 0: This case models the backfire effect where
βiyi(t)yj(t) < −1. Since βi > 0, yi(t)yj(t) < 0, that is,
nodes i and j hold opposing views. Multiplying yj(t) with
this negative weightwij(t) in the summation in the numer-
ator leads to a contribution of the same sign as yi(t), while
adding the negative weight to the denominator reduces it,
inflating the resulting quotient. The combination of these
two effects models the backfire effect.
2. wij(t) > 0: This case models biased assimilation, includ-
ing two subcases:
(a) 0 < βiyi(t)yj(t): Thus, node i and j have both pos-
itive or both negative opinions, resulting in an in-
creased weight wij(t). In this case node i assimilates
the opinion of neighbor j more strongly if the extent
of their agreement is stronger.
(b) −1 < βiyi(t)yj(t) < 0: Here nodes i and j hold
opposing but not too different opinions. In this case,
node i critically evaluates the conflicting opinion of
node j, but still assimilates it to a reduced extent.
Note that the denominator in Eq. (2) can become 0 result-
ing in a diverging opinion, or negative causing an unnatural
opinion reversal. We consider this situation to be beyond the
model’s validity region, and thus define the BEBA model as:
yi(t+ 1) =
{
sgn(yi(t)) if wii +
∑
j∈N(i) wij(t) ≤ 0,
wiiyi(t)+
∑
j∈N(i) wij(t)yj(t)
wii+
∑
j∈N(i) wij(t)
otherwise.
Moreover, for a small denominator the resulting opinions
may fall outside the range [−1, 1]. To address this, we addi-
tionally clip negative values at −1 and positive values at 1.
3.3 Comparison of the BEBA and BOF models
There is a similarity between the BOF and our BEBA model,
in that both alter the weights of the DeGroot’s. Consider a
simple star graph of five nodes where node 1 is in the center,
and focus on one iteration of updating on node 1. In this case,
we can observe how the two models update the opinion of a
single node, given the opinions of her neighborhood.
First, we deal with the fact that BOF model assumes only
positive opinion values, while our model assumes opinions
being both positive and negative. Note that the value range of
opinions is important in both models, since the BOF model
weights the opinion values, while our model exploits the dis-
agreement in the sign. To compare the models, we assume
positive opinion values xi(t) ∈ [0, 1] on all nodes in the
graph, and use them to implement an update of the BOF
model. For our model, we transform opinions to the range
Figure 1: Opinion Formation on the Star Graph
(b)(a)
Figure 2: x1(t + 1) as a function of xi(t), (a) β1 = 1, b1 = 1,
x1(t) = 0; (b) β1 = 2.5, b1 = 1, x1(t) = 0.25.
[−1, 1] by setting yi(t) = 2xi(t) − 1. Then we compute the
value y1(t+ 1) as defined in BEBA, and rescale back.
In our experiment we assume xi(t) identical for all i =
2, ..., 5, and xi(t) ∈ [0, 1] for all nodes. We set w11 = 1 for
both models, b1 = 1 for BOF, and consider the values of 1 and
2.5 for β1 in BEBA model. The opinion value x1(t + 1) for
both models, as a function of x2,3,4,5(t) and x1(t) is shown
in Figure 1. The difference between the two models becomes
clear when x1(t) takes extreme values (i.e., 0 or 1).
Figure 2(a) shows the curves for the two models when
x1(t) = 0. In BOF, the opinion x1(t + 1) remains un-
changed at value 0. This is true regardless of the value of
b1. Thus, extreme nodes never change their opinions, even a
little, even when they are not biased at all. However, accord-
ing to the biased assimilation, unbiased individuals should be
influenced by similar opinions, while even extreme nodes as-
similate opinions that are close to their own. In contrast, our
model better captures the biased assimilation in this case. In
Figure 2(a), for β1 = 1, which corresponds to a mildly biased
node, the opinion of node 1 can be moderated by that of her
neighbors to different extents, while x1(t+ 1) never exceeds
0.5. Therefore, extreme nodes are not stuck in the extremes.
To better understand the backfire effect, we increase β1 to
2.5, and set x1(t) = 0.25 as shown in Figure 2(b). We ob-
serve that when the disagreement between node 1 and her
neighbors becomes large (i.e., > 0.9), x1(t+ 1) drops under
0.25, until it becomes completely extreme with value 0.
From the plots in Figure 2 we also observe that for the
different combinations of β1 and x1(t), there exists a value
of the neighboring opinions that causes the largest change
in x1(t + 1). For example, when β1 = 1 and x1(t) = 0,
neighboring opinion of around 0.75 is the most influential as
shown in Figure 2(a); for β1 = 2.5 and x1(t) = 0.25, opinion
around 0.7 is the most influential according to Figure 2(b).
4 Theoretical Analysis
This section contains theoretical analysis of the BEBA model
for two settings1. First we investigate the dynamics of opin-
ions for a single agent in a fixed environment, and secondly
we study the dynamics of polarization for all nodes in a con-
nected social network.
4.1 A single agent in a fixed environment
Here we theoretically analyze the limit behavior of a single
agent’s opinion in an environment with a fixed opinion. An
analysis of this type has been done for the BOF model [Dan-
dekar et al., 2013]. The setup is admittedly somewhat artifi-
cial but helps to gain a better understanding of the model. It
has been deemed realistic in cases where the fixed environ-
ment consists of the news media, billboards, etc. [Dandekar
et al., 2013]. It also models the situation where the single
agent is connected to a network that is large enough such that
adding it will not meaningfully affect the network.
For the agent i, we denote y(t) ∈ [−1, 1] its opinion at
time t, β > 0 its entrenchment parameter, and y its converged
opinion (i.e., limt→∞ y(t)). We assume the agent weighs its
own opinion with wii = w. For simplicity, we only con-
sider the situation where the environment contains one node,
but it should be noted that the analysis below can be easily
generalized to several nodes. Let p ∈ [−1, 1] be the fixed
environmental opinion. Then, according to BEBA, the agent
updates its opinion as follows:
y(t+ 1) =
{
sgn(y(t)) if w + βpy(t) + 1 ≤ 0,
wy(t)+βp2y(t)+p
w+βpy(t)+1 otherwise.
Before stating a theorem that quantitatively characterizes
the limit y, we consider the behavior. [Case 1:] For suffi-
ciently small entrenchment β (i.e., not biased), the fixed en-
vironment’s opinion p will be sufficiently attracting such that
y = p regardless of y(t). The same is true when p = 0:
the neutral opinion is never polarizing and thus always at-
tracting. [Case 2:] On the other hand, for sufficiently large
entrenchment β (i.e., biased), the limit y will depend on the
similarity of initial opinion y(t) with the environment’s opin-
ion p: [Case 2a:] if y(t) is similar to p, p should have an
attracting effect on y(t) such that its limit y = p; [Case 2b:]
if y(t) is very different from p, however, the backfire effect
will cause the agent’s opinion to diverge from p, such that
y = sgn(y(t)). [Case 2c:] Between Case 2a and Case 2b,
there will be a ‘sweet spot’ where y(t) is neither sufficiently
similar to p for y(t) to converge to p, nor sufficiently different
1Supplemental materials including theoretical proofs, datasets
information, and more experimental results available in the Ap-
pendix.
Figure 3: Graphical illustration of Case 2 from Theorem 1 (i.e. p <
0 and β ≥ −1/p). [Case 2a:] For values of y(t) in the green range,
y(t) will converge to y = p. [Case 2b:] For values of y(t) in the red
range, y(t) will diverge to y = 1. [Case 2c:] For y(t) = − 1
βp
, y(t)
will not change such that y = − 1
βp
.
for it to diverge to sgn(y(t)). This is an unstable equilibrium
where y(t) remains constant through time, i.e. y = y(t).
This intuition is formalized in the following theorem. For
conciseness and transparency, we state it for the situation
where p ≤ 0. It is trivial to adapt the theorem for p ≥ 0.
Theorem 1. Depending on the value of β relative to p:
Case 1: When p = 0 or β < −1/p, the agent’s opinion al-
ways converges to p, i.e., y = p.
Case 2: When p < 0 and β ≥ −1/p, there are three pos-
sibilities depending on how similar y(t) is to p. (This
situation is illustrated in Figure 3.)
a: If y(t) < − 1βp , y(t) will be sufficiently attracted to p
such that y = p.
b: If y(t) > − 1βp , y(t) will diverge away from p such
that y = sgn(y(t)) = 1.
c: If y(t) = − 1βp , y(t) will remain constant through
time, such that y = − 1βp .
Theorem 1 already suggests that opinions under the BEBA
model evolve to one of three possible states: consensus (Case
1 and Case 2a), polarization (Case 2b), and an unstable state
of persistent disagreement (Case 2c).
4.2 Polarization and consensus for general
networks and initial opinions
Here we extend from the single agent to a group of individ-
uals that can update their opinions at any time step t. The
dynamics of polarization are investigated theoretically with
respect to different values of the entrenchment parameter. It
was argued by the authors of the BOF model that homophily
alone, without biased assimilation was not sufficient for po-
larization [Dandekar et al., 2013]. In our BEBA model, the
backfire effect and biased assimilation, without homophily,
are sufficient to lead to polarization or consensus, depending
on the parameters and the initial opinions. The theorem be-
low makes this clear, by providing easy-to-realize sufficient
conditions for polarization or consensus to occur.
Theorem 2. Let G = (V,E) be any connected unweighted
undirected network. For all i ∈ V , yi(t) ∈ (−1, 0)∪ (0, 1) is
the opinion of node i at time t, let wii = 1 and βi = β > 0
for all i ∈ V . Denote y(t) the opinion vector of G at time
t, |y(t)| is the vector with the absolute values of all opinions,
and min(y(t)) is the minimum element in y(t). Then,
1. Polarization: If β > 1
[min(|y(0)|)]2 , ∀i ∈ V , |yi| = 1.
2. Consensus: If β < 1
[max(|y(0)|)]2 , there exists a unique
y∗ ∈ [−max (|y(0)|) ,max (|y(0)|)] such that yi = y∗,
∀i ∈ V .
A special case of particular theoretical interest is when
min (|y(0)|) = max (|y(0)|). Then there are only two dif-
ferent initial opinions in the network, with the same absolute
value but opposite signs (i.e. they could represent ’for’ and
’against’ an issue of interest). In this case, the sufficient con-
ditions also become necessary conditions, and a borderline
situation emerges to which we refer as persistent disagree-
ment. It can be proved concisely by relying on Theorem 2,
and thus we state it as a Corollary:
Corollary 1. Let G = (V1, V2, E) be any connected un-
weighted undirected network. For all i ∈ V = V1 ∪ V2, let
wii = 1 and βi = β > 0. Assume for all i ∈ V1, yi(0) = y0,
where 0 < y0 < 1; while for all i ∈ V2, yi(0) = −y0. Then,
1. Polarization: If β > 1
y20
, ∀i ∈ V1 ∪ V2, |yi| = 1.
2. Persistent disagreement: If β = 1
y20
(i.e., when wij = 0
if i ∈ V1 and j ∈ V2), ∀i ∈ V1, yi(t′) = y0 for all
t′ ≥ 0, and ∀i ∈ V2, yi(t′) = −y0 for all t′ ≥ 0.
3. Consensus: If β < 1
y20
, then there exists a unique y∗ ∈
(−y0, y0) such that ∀i ∈ V , yi = y∗.
Intriguingly, these conditions in the Theorem and Corol-
lary are independent of the network structure and depend only
on the entrenchment parameter β and the opinion vector at
time 0. Yet, it should be noted that the value of the consen-
sus and the eventual polarized state do depend on the network
structure. Moreover, the network structure, and the distribu-
tion of the opinions over it, do determine whether polarization
or consensus will arise when neither of the sufficient condi-
tions of Theorem 2 are satisfied. These claims are confirmed
in experiments in the next section.
5 Experimental Analysis
In Section 4 we provided sufficient conditions for our model
to reach consensus or polarization. In this section we perform
an experimental analysis of how these two phenomena man-
ifest themselves on real and synthetic networks. Our goal is
to answer the following questions:
• In the case that the network reaches consensus, what is the
value of the consensus opinion, and how does the network
structure, β, and the initial opinion vector affect this value?
• In the case that the opinions polarize, what is the state of
the polarization and how is it affected by the initial opin-
ions, β, and the structure of the networks?
We use both real-world and synthetic networks in our ex-
periments. The real datasets include Zachary’s Karate Club
network [Zachary, 1977] and six Twitter networks with given
opinions for different events ranging from political elections
to sports activities [Zarezade et al., 2017; De et al., 2016].
See the Appendix for details. The synthetic networks are:
• Erdo˝s-Re´nyi (ER) networks G(n, ρ) have binomial degree
distributions, where ρ is the edge connection probability
between nodes [Bolloba´s, 2001].
• Watts-Strogatz (WS) networks G(n,K, 1) have the small
world property of with K being the average degree, and
(b)
(d)(c)
𝒚(0)(a)
Figure 4: For the Karate network: (a) the distribution of βP (i.e.,
the smallest β that results in polarization) for 10000 random opinion
vectors (uniform on [−1, 1]); for one opinion vector, (b) the variance
of all converged y as β increases from 0 to 10; (c) consensus opinion
values for β ∈ [0, 2.1]; (d) final opinions for each of the nodes.
we fix the rewiring probability to be 1 (i.e., random graph),
thus only refer to K [Watts and Strogatz, 1998].
• Baraba´si-Albert (BA) networks G(n,M0,M) are scale-
free, where M0 is the number of initial nodes and M the
number of nodes that a new node is connected to [Albert
and Baraba´si, 2002].
5.1 The influence of the entrenchment β
From Theorem 2, we know the stationary opinion vector y
of our model polarizes when β > 1[min(|y(0)|)]2 , and reaches
consensus when β < 1[max(|y(0)|)]2 . However, these limits are
far away from each other and polarization may occur at much
lower values of β in practice, similarly consensus for higher
β. We now take the Karate network as an example and exam-
ine the relation between β and polarization experimentally
using random initial opinion vectors.
Let βP denote the threshold between consensus and po-
larization for any pair of network and opinion vector. Fig-
ure 4(a) shows the distribution of the empirical βP values
for 10000 different random opinion vectors, where yi(0) is
uniform within [−1, 1]. We observe that the threshold for po-
larization is much smaller than the theoretical value, which
should be lager than 104. However, the empirical value of βP
is below 5 for most of the y(0), and never exceeds 7.
In Figure 4(b), the variance of the stationary opinion vector
is plotted as a function of β, for one of the opinion vectors.
When there is consensus the variance is zero, while when the
variance is greater than zero, polarization is obtained (i.e.,
different variances correspond to different polarized states).
We observe that as β increases, the opinion vector converges
from consensus to polarized states. Empirically, no persis-
tent disagreement is achieved. For this y(0), polarization is
shown if β > 2.1 such that βP = 2.1.
(a) (b)
Figure 5: For 1000 random y(0) on Karate network: (a) consensus
opinion when β = 1; (b) mean polarized opinion when β = 10.
(b)(a)
Figure 6: Based on one ER (n = 100, ρ = 0.0606), one WS (n =
100,K = 3), and one BA network (n = 100,M0 = 4,M = 3):
(a) distribution of βP for 1000 random opinion vectors; (b) for 100
opinion vectors, mean y(0) vs. the consensus value (β = 1).
When reaching consensus, Figure 4(c) shows that the con-
sensus value becomes less neutral as β increases. This is true
for 78.74% of the 10000 vectors on Karate network. Mean-
while, different βs do not necessarily result in the same po-
larized state (see Figure 4(d)). The heatmap shows different
polarized states for different values of β for this y(0).
5.2 The influence of the opinion vector y(0)
In this experiment, we investigate the influence y(0) on the
consensus opinion value and the mean polarized opinion.
Figure 5 shows that the consensus value and the mean po-
larized opinion are strongly correlated to the mean of y(0).
Meanwhile, Figure 5(b) shows that in the case of polarization,
opinion vectors with similar initial means may result in quite
different polarized states because the placements of the opin-
ions on nodes differ. Also, y(0) with different means may
result in similar polarization (i.e., mean polarized opinion).
Then we analyze two real datasets Tw:Club (i.e., Barcelona
getting the first place in La-liga 2016) and Tw: Sport
(Champions League final in 2015 between Juventus and Real
Madrid), which have the same network but different initial
opinion vectors. It is found that the βP is 11.7 for Tw:Club
and 3.3 for Tw:Sport, which indicates the Champions League
final gets polarized more easily than the other event.
5.3 The influence of the network topology G
In this experiment, we study how the topology affects the βP
for the same (set of) y(0), as well as the stationary opinion
vectors of our model. To this end, we generated networks
Table 1: βP for real-world twitter datasets
Network βP Network βP Network βP
Tw:GoT 2.9 Tw:Club 3.3 Tw:US 4.9
Tw:UK 7.5 Tw:Delhi 7.7 Tw:Sport 11.7
with the three random network models, with the same number
of nodes, intialized with the same opinion vectors.
We observe that for networks with the same number of
nodes and similar numbers of edges, different network prop-
erties result in different dynamics of polarization. Figure 6(a)
shows that for the same set of y(0), the distributions of the
βP value for the three models. It shows that the βP has a
larger mean in the WS model, indicating networks with this
structure may be more robust against polarization. We also
observe the standard deviation of the βP values for the BA
distribution is larger, which appears to be due to ’hub’ nodes,
whose opinions strongly affect the value of βP .
Figure 6(b) plots the consensus values reached by a set
of 100 random opinion vectors on the three networks. The
shapes of scatter plots become increasingly compact from the
BA model, the ER model, to the WS model, corroborating the
larger variance in the opinion dynamics on BA networks.
The parameters in each model also affect the dynamics, see
the supplement in the Appendix. For example, when the edge
probability ρ in the ER model increases from a small num-
ber, which guarantees a connected network, to 1, βP varies
less for ER models with similar ρ. The experimental results
are similar for the consensus value, and the polarized opinion.
Not only the number of edges has an influence on the dynam-
ics of polarization, but also the placement of the edges.
5.4 Real-world dataset analysis
Based on the six real-world twitter datasets [Zarezade et al.,
2017; De et al., 2016], we investigate how easily each event
gets polarized opinions, namely the value of βP . It is shown
in Table 1 that political events are apparently less likely to
polarize, except the US one. While the sport or TV events
are more likely get polarized, except when people had to bet
instead of supporting (i.e., Tw:Club).
6 Conclusion and Future Work
Modeling how opinions evolve when individuals interact in
social networks is an important computational social science
challenge that has received renewed attention recently. The
availability of realistic models of this type may have substan-
tial real-life impact on a variety of applications, from political
campaigns design, to conflict prevention and mitigation.
A large number of models have been proposed in the liter-
ature. To the best of our knowledge, however, none of them
model the so-called Backfire Effect: the fact that individuals,
when exposed to a strongly opposing view, will not be mod-
erated, but rather become more entrenched in their opinion.
Here we proposed the BEBA model, which models both
Biased Assimilation and Backfire Effect. It is governed by
one parameter (which can vary over the individuals), called
the entrenchment parameter, determining the strength of both.
The BEBA model naturally generates different behaviors:
from convergence to a consensus, to polarization.
Theoretical and empirical analyses demonstrate that the re-
sulting model is not only realistic, its behavior also provides
an interesting view on the interplay between network struc-
ture, the entrenchment parameter, and the opinions.
These properties make the BEBA model a useful tool for
simulating the effect of interventions, such as editing the net-
work (e.g. by facilitating communication between particular
pairs of individuals), altering the initial opinions (e.g. through
targeted information campaigns), or affecting the entrench-
ment of particular individuals (e.g. through education).
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A Proof of Theorem 1
A.1 Only one node in the environment
Recall that there is one node with a fixed opinion p ∈ [−1, 1]
in the environment. The opinion of the agent is updated as
mentioned in Section 4.
Lemma 3. If w + βpy(t) + 1 ≤ 0, the opinion of the agent
stays at sgn(y(t)) for all t′ > t.
Proof. As shown in the updating rule that whenw+βpy(t)+
1 ≤ 0, y(t+1) = sgn(y(t)). w+βpy(t)+1 ≤ 0 is equivalent
to βpy(t) ≤ −w − 1 < 0. Knowing that |y(t+ 1)| = 1 ≥
|y(t)|,
βpy(t+ 1) ≤ −w − 1
Therefore, y(t′) = sgn(y(t + 1)) = sgn(y(t)) for all t′ >
t.
Lemma 4. If w+βpy(t)+1 > 0, there exist two fixed points
where y(t+1) = y(t): p and− 1βp . p is attracting while− 1βp
is repelling.
Proof. The converged opinion y of the agent should satisfy
f(y) =
wy + βp2y + p
w + βpy + 1
f(y)− y = −βpy
2 + (βp2 − 1)y + p
w + βpy + 1
=
u(y)
v(y)
= 0 (3)
where
u(y) = −βpy2 + (βp2 − 1)y + p
v(y) = βpy + w + 1
By solving u(y) = 0, which is equivalent to f(y) − y = 0
since u(y) > 0, the two fixed points of f(y) are: p and − 1βp .
Next, we prove that p is attracting and − 1βp is repelling.
f ′(y) =
w(w + βp2)
(w + βpy + 1)2
≥ 0
|f ′(y)| = f ′(y), then f ′(p) = w(w+βp2)(w+βp2+1)2 < 1, thus attract-
ing; while f ′(y − 1βp ) = w(w+βp
2)
w2 > 1, thus repelling.
Lemma 5. If w + βpy(t) + 1 > 0 and py(t) ≥ 0, y = p.
Proof. If p = 0, y(t + 1) = ww+1y(t), as the iteration goes,
limt→∞ y(t) = 0;
If py(t) > 0, e.g., they are both positive
• when 0 < y(t) < p, y(t + 1) − y(t) = u(y(t))v(y(t)) > 0,
thus y(t + 1) > y(t), the agent’s opinion increases until it
reaches p;
• when p < y(t) < 1, y(t + 1) − y(t) < 0, the agent’s
opinion decreases to p.
Lemma 6. If w + βpy(t) + 1 > 0 and py(t) < 0,
1. If
∣∣∣ 1βp ∣∣∣ > 1, limt→∞ y(t) = ye.
2. If
∣∣∣ 1βp ∣∣∣ ≤ 1,
(a) If |y(t)| <
∣∣∣ 1βp ∣∣∣, y = p.
(b) If y(t) = − 1βp , y(t′) = − 1βp for all t′ ≥ t.
(c) If
∣∣∣ 1βp ∣∣∣ < |y(t)| ≤ 1, y = sgn(y(t)).
Proof. Assume y(t) ∈ (0, 1] and p ∈ (−1, 0),
• if
∣∣∣ 1βp ∣∣∣ > 1, all y(t) ∈ (0, 1] < − 1βp , y(t) is attracted to p
as the updating goes;
• if
∣∣∣ 1βp ∣∣∣ = 1, y(t) is repelled by the extreme point and goes
to the attracting one unless it starts with − 1βp at time t;
• if
∣∣∣ 1βp ∣∣∣ < 1, when 0 < y(t) < − 1βp , y(t + 1) − y(t) =
u(y(t))
v(y(t)) < 0, y(t+ 1) < y(t), the agent’s opinion decreases
to p; when y(t) = − 1βp , y(t) stays there; when y(t) >
− 1βp , y(t+ 1) > y(t), the agent’s opinion increases to the
extreme value on its side.
A.2 A group of nodes in the environment
Assume there is a set of m neighbour with different fixed
opinions, p = (p1, p2, ..., pm), m > 1. We denote
• q = ∑j p2j the sum of the squares of the fixed opinions.
• s = ∑j pj the sum of the fixed opinions.
• m = ∑j 1 the number of nodes in the environment.
Lemma 7. mq − s2 ≥ 0, which is m∑j p2j ≥ (∑j pj)2.
Proof.
m
∑
j
p2j − (
∑
j
xj)
2 =
1
2
∑
i
∑
j
(pi − pj)2 ≥ 0
The agent’s opinion is updated by
y(t+ 1) =
{
sgn(y(t)) if w + βsy(t) +m ≤ 0,
wy(t)+βqy(t)+s
w+βsy(t)+m otherwise.
(4)
Lemma 8. Ifw+βsy(t)+m > 0, there exist two fixed points
where y(t+ 1) = y(t):
ya =
βq −m+√∆
2βs
yr =
βq −m−√∆
2βs
where ∆ = (βq −m)2 + 4βs2. ya is attracting while yr is
repelling.
Proof. The function is f(y) = wy+βqy+sw+βsy+m . The two fixed
points satisfy f(y) = y. |f ′(y)| = f ′(y) since
f ′(y) =
(w + βq)(w +m)− βs2
(βsy + w +m)2
=
w(w +m) + βqw + β(qm− s2)
(βsy + w +m)2
> 0
For ya = βq−m+
√
∆
2βs , f
′(ya) < 1 because
f ′(ya)− 1 =− 1
2
(m− βq)2 + 4βs2 + (2w +m+ βq)√∆
(βsya + w +m)2
<0
For yr = βq−m−
√
∆
2βs , f
′(yr) > 1 because
f ′(yr)− 1 =− 1
2
(m− βq)2 + 4βs2 − (2w +m+ βq)√∆
(βsyr + w +m)2
=− 1
2
A
B
A
B < 0 sinceB > 0 and it can be proved as below thatA < 0.[
(m− βq)2 + 4βs2]2 − [(2w +m+ βq)√∆]2
=4
[
(m− βq)2 + 4βs2] [β(s2 − qm)− w(m+ w + βq)]
<0
Therefore, ya is attracting and yr is repelling.
B Proof of Theorem 2
Recall that yi(t) ∈ (−1, 0)∪(0, 1). Given any opinion vector
y(0) of a given connected network G = (V,E), the opinions
can be divided into two groups V1 and V2 at any time t: a)
∀i ∈ V1, yi(t) > 0; b)∀i ∈ V2, yi(t) < 0, and V = V1 ∪ V2.
Denote nsi (t) the number of node i’s neighbors node that are
in the same group with i at time t, and ndi (t) the number of
neighbors in the different group. Specifically, they are de-
noted as
nsi (t) =|N(i)s|, N(i)s = {j|j ∈ N(i), and yi(t)yj(t) > 0}
ndi (t) =|N(i)d|, N(i)d = {k|k ∈ N(i), and yi(t)yk(t) < 0}
Lemma 9. For node i ∈ V fix βi = β > 0, if β >
1
[min(|y(0)|)]2 , limt→∞ |yi(t)| = 1.
Proof. For node i ∈ V , the opinion is updated with BEBA.
If γ = 1 +
∑
j∈N(i) wij ≤ 0, yi(t + 1) reaches the extreme
value in one iteration due to strong backfire effect.
While when γ > 0, for any t > 0, yi(t+ 1) is updated as
yi(t)
1 +
∑
j∈N(i)s wij
yj(t)
yi(t)
+
∑
k∈N(i)d wik
yk(t)
yi(t)
1 +
∑
j∈N(i)s wij +
∑
k∈N(i)d wik
= yi(t)
C
D
(5)
When β > 1
[min(|y(t)|)]2 , for all k ∈ N(i)d, wik =
βyi(t)yk(t) + 1 < 0. The sums in Equation (5) satisfy:∑
j∈N(i)s wij
yj(t)
yi(t)
,
∑
j∈N(i)s wij ,
∑
k∈N(i)d wik
yk(t)
yi(t)
> 0,
and
∑
k∈N(i)d wik < 0.
Now we focus on the node that has the most moderate
opinion, namely the node with absolute value of opinion
min |y(t)| at each time step, starting from time 0. Knowing
C,D > 0,
C −D =
∑
j∈N(i)s
wij(
yj(t)
yi(t)
− 1) +
∑
k∈N(i)d
wik(
yk(t)
yi(t)
− 1)
(6)
Since yi(t) has the smallest absolute opinion value, for any
j ∈ N(i)s, yj(t)yi(t) ≥ 1, thus C > D, CD > 1, and |yi(t+ 1)| >
|yi(t)|.
After every iteration from time t to t+1, the opinion of the
most moderate node becomes more extreme, until it reaches
the absolute value of 1, thus for any i ∈ V , limt→∞ |yi(t)| =
1.
Lemma 10. For node i ∈ V , if β < 1
[max(|y(0)|)]2 , there ex-
ists a unique y∗ ∈ [−max (|y(0)|) ,max (|y(0)|)] such that
limt→∞ yi(t) = y∗ for all i ∈ V .
Proof. When β < 1
[max(|y(0)|)]2 , γ = 1 +
∑
j∈N(i) wij > 0
because for any j ∈ N(i), wij = βyi(t)yj(t) + 1 > 0.
For any t > 1, yi(t + 1) is updated as in
Equation (5), however, the sums have different values:∑
j∈N(i)s wij
yj(t)
yi(t)
,
∑
j∈N(i)s wij ,
∑
k∈N(i)d wik > 0, and∑
k∈N(i)d wik
yk(t)
yi(t)
< 0.
Then we focus on the most opinionated node, which means
the node has the largest absolution value of its opinion
max |y(t)|, starting from time 0. Knowing D > 0,
• when C > 0, C − D is shown in Equation (6). With i
being the most opinionated node, yj(t)yi(t) ≤ 1 for all j ∈
N(i)s; yk(t)yi(t) < 0 for all k ∈ N(i)d. Therefore, C < D,
0 < CD < 1 and |yi(t+ 1)| < |yi(t)|.
• when C = 0, yi(t+ 1) = 0.
• when C < 0, −C −D is shown in Equation (7). As −1 ≤
yk(t)
yi(t)
≤ 0 for k ∈ N(i)d,−C−D < 0, 0 < ∣∣CD ∣∣ < 1, thus
|yi(t+ 1)| < |yi(t)|.
−2−
∑
j∈N(i)s
wij(
yj(t)
yi(t)
+ 1)−
∑
k∈N(i)d
wik(
yk(t)
yi(t)
+ 1)
(7)
At every time step, the most opinionated node get moder-
ated until they reach consensus - there is no such node and
the updating process stops because consensus is reached.
Lemma 11. For node i ∈ V1, yi(0) = y0, where 0 < y0 < 1;
∀i ∈ V2, yi(0) = −y0. If β = 1y20 , yi(t) = yi(0) for all t ≥ 0.
Proof. When β = 1
y20
, wij = 1y20 yi(t)yj(t). At time 1,
yi(1) =
yi(0) + 2n
s
i (0)yi(0)
1 + 2nsi (0)
= yi(0)
For any t ≥ 1,
yi(t+ 1) =
yi(t) + 2n
s
i (t)yi(t)
1 + 2nsi (t)
= yi(t) = yi(0)
.
C Datasets and experimental results
C.1 Real-world datasets
Table 2: Real-world dataset summary
Network |V | |E| Event
Karate 34 78 Friendship
Tw:Club 703 3322 Barcelona in La-liga 2016
Tw:Sport 703 3322 Juventus vs Real Madrid 2015
Tw:US 533 13564 US Presidential Election 2016
Tw:UK 231 905 British Election 2015
Tw:Delhi 548 3638 Delhi Assembly Election 2013
Tw:GoT 947 7922 GoT promotion 2015
C.2 Influence of the opinion vector y(0) and
network topology G
This figure corresponds to Figure 5, and is used to investi-
gate both the effects of the opinion vector and the network
topology. Horizontal subfigures show the different consensus
and polarization converging states for different y(0)s, while
the vertical subfigures show the differences between the three
types of random networks of similar sizes. The finding of this
experiment is consistent with that of Figure 6(b).
C.3 Influence of model parameters
(b)(a)
Figure 8: For an random opinion vector y(0), on ER models with
n = 100 and ρ ∈ (0, 1]. (a) the value of βP for the y(0); (b) the
consensus opinion reach by y(0) when β = 1.
(c)
(a)
(d)
(b)
(e) (f)
Figure 7: For 1000 random y(0). (a) and (b) on a BA model (n =
34,M0 = 3,M = 2); (c) and (d) on an ER model (n = 34, ρ =
0.139); (e) and (f) on a WS model (n = 34,K = 2). The left
column of (a), (c), (e) - the consensus opinion when β = 1; the right
column of (b), (d), (f) - the mean polarized opinion when β = 10.
This experiment takes the ER model as an example and in-
vestigates the influence of the parameter ρ on the network
topology, thus resulting in the influence on opinion dynam-
ics.
C.4 Influence of edge placements
(b)(a)
Figure 9: For an random opinion vector y(0) with mean −0.0395,
on 1000 ER models with n = 100 and ρ = 0.4. (a) the value of βP
for the y(0); (b) the consensus opinion reach by y(0) when β = 1.
ER model is taken again as the example here for investigating
the influence of the network edge placements on opinion dy-
namics. It shows that the network topology does have signif-
icant influence on the value of βP and the consensus opinion
value.
C.5 Influence of the edge addition/deletion in the
network
We can also investigate the question: If someone wants to
maximally increase/decrease the value of consensus opinion
or the average polarized opinion, which edge should be re-
moved/added?
Add One Edge - Consensus.
(a) (b)
Figure 10: Add one edge on Karate network to change the consensus
opinion - β = 1. Top 10 best choices are highlighted: green for
increase and red for decrease.
Delete One Edge - Consensus.
(a) (b)
Figure 11: Delete one edge on Karate network to change the con-
sensus opinion - β = 1. Top 5 best choices are highlighted: green
for increase and red for decrease.
It shows in Figure 10 and 11 that in order to maximally
increase the consensus value by editing one edge, adding
the edge between the most opinionated disconnected negative
nodes is the best choice when allowing only addition; while
deleting the edge between the most opinionated connected
positive nodes is the most effective way if allowing only dele-
tion. A smaller consensus opinion value can be achieved by
adding the edge between the most positive opinionated nodes
or deleting the one between the most negatively opinionated
nodes.
Edge edition that has almost no influence on consensus.
(a) (b)
Figure 12: Additions - (a) and Deletions - (b) that cause minor
change in consensus values on Karate network. (|change| < 10−3)
However, the connections between nodes with equivalently
(i.e., in terms of absolute opinion value) opposing opinions
have almost no influence on the consensus value, as shown in
Figure 12. In contrast, when the network gets polarized, the
neighbors of the neutral nodes have more significant influence
on the mean polarized opinions.
